

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 7677

EXDIS

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PE, CI

SUBJECT: BILATERAL WITH PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1. SUMMARY: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS MET PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER DE LA FLOR FOR AN HOUR NOVEMBER 11 AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. LUIGI EINAUDI AND PERUVIAN AMBASSADORS MARCHAND AND ALVARADO GARRIDO WERE ALSO PRESENT AS DE LA FLOR EXPOUNDED ON A RANGE OF TOPICS, FROM THE CUBAN SANCTIONS TO A VARIETY OF BILATERAL TOPICS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW FISHING BOAT SEIZURES, AND THE DECEMBER AYACUCHO CELEBRATIONS. THE DOMINANT THEME, HOWEVER, WAS DE LA FLOR'S CONCERN OVER THE DANGER OF ARMED CONFLICT WITH CHILE. END SUMMARY.

2. CUBA SANCTIONS. DE LA FLOR SAID IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA BE LIFTED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. A FAVORABLE UNITED STATES VOTE WOULD BRING A NUMBER OF SWING VOTES WITH IT. WHEN TOLD THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD PROBABLY ABSTAIN, DE LA FLOR COMMENTED THAT A MAJORITY WOULD VOTE TO LIFT SANCTIONS IN ANY CASE, AND THAT THE SANCTIONS WOULD THEN BE POLITICALLY DEAD EVEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED TWO-THIRDS.

3. TURNING TO BILATERAL ISSUES, DE LA FLOR COMMENTED THAT US-PERUVIAN RELATIONS HAD IMPROVED SUBSTANTIALLY SINCE THE CONFIDENTIAL

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1968 REVOLUTION AND THAT THE GREENE AGREEMENT LAST FEBRUARY HELPED CONSIDERABLY. NONETHELESS, OCCASIONAL PROBLEMS MIGHT STILL DEVELOP OR RECRUESCE. WITH THE TUNA SEASON APPROACHING AGAIN, FOR EXAMPLE, IT MIGHT PROVE TO BE VERY DIFFICULT "TO

CONTINUE TO AVOID SEEING" U.S. TUNA VESSELS OPERATING WITHOUT LICENSES IN PERUVIAN WATERS, IF THEY COME TOO CLOSE TO SHORE.

4. BRANIFF. DE LA FLOR ARGUED THAT BRANIFF HAD OBTAINED A PRIVILEGED POSITION WHEN APSA WENT OUT OF SERVICE (A DEVELOPMENT HE SAID BRANIFF HELPED ALONG). ALL PERU WANTED NOW WAS A REDUCTION OF BRANIFF'S FREQUENCIES FROM ITS TEMPORARY ADVANTAGE TO A STILL SOMEWHAT PRIVILEGED POSITION WHEN COMPARED WITH OTHER FOREIGN AIRLINES. THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW OPENING MIGHT TAKE A LONG TIME, BUT THE IMPORTANT THING WOULD BE TO KEEP TALKING.

5. PLANNING TALKS. AN INTER-MINISTERIAL GROUP WOULD MEET THE S/P TEAM, WHICH WOULD ALSO MEET WITH GENERAL GRAHAM. CONTACT WITH PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT LEADERS WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THERE WAS LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PERUVIAN REVOLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES. AS A MILITARY MAN, HE COULD SAY CLEARLY THAT SECURITY RESTED ON THE PEOPLE, AND ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, NOT ON ARMS.

6. AYACUCHO. ROGERS INDICATED THAT WE WERE HONORED BY THE PERUVIAN INVITATION TO THE SECRETARY TO ATTEND THE AYACUCHO CELEBRATIONS. DE LA FLOR SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTERS INVITED INCLUDED THOSE OF ENGLAND AND SPAIN PLUS ALL THOSE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE WITHOUT EXCEPTION, INCLUDING CANADA, THE UNITED STATES AND (UNMENTIONED) CUBA. DE LA FLOR HOPED VERY MUCH THE SECRETARY COULD ATTEND, AND SAID THAT PERUVIANS WOULD MAKE MAJOR EFFORTS TO MEET THE SECRETARY'S REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING, IF DESIRED, A PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT VELASCO. ROGERS SAID HE WOULD TAKE THE MATTER UP WITH THE SECRETARY UPON HIS RETURN.

7. PERU-CHILE. PITE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, PERU AND CHILE HAD AGREED ON 80 PERCENT OF FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS WHILE ALLENDE WAS IN OFFICE. SINCE THEN, AGREEMENT HAD BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO DISAGREEMENT. EVEN SO, PERU HAD BEGUN TO REARM IN 1972, BEFORE THE FALL OF ALLENDE, BECAUSE OF INFORMATION THAT THE CHILEANS WERE ARMING. SINCE THE UNITED STATES HAD "LOCKED CONFIDENTIAL

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THE DOORS", PERU SOUGHT ARMS WHERE IT COULD. ALTHOUGH A MILITARY AND NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT COULD AFFORD TO DO NOTHING LESS, PERU WAS NOW ACCUSED IN THE PRESS OF HAVING AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS. TENDENTIOUS ARTICLES IN THE CHILEAN PRESS WERE CREATING A WAR PYSCHOSIS. CHILE HAD MOVED TROOPS TO THE NORTH. UNITED STATES' MILITARY ADVISORS WERE ACTIVE IN ARICA AND IQUIQUE. NEW SHIPMENTS OF U.S. TANKS HAD ARRIVED IN ARICA. ALLOWING FOR EXAGGERATION, DE LA FLOR FELT THESE REPORTS WERE STILL DEEPLY TROUBLING. PERU COULD NOT PERMIT THE EQUILIBRIUM TO BE BROKEN. PERU WAS NOT NOW AND WOULD NEVER BE A COMMUNIST COUNTRY. PERU WOULD NEVER ATTACK. BUT PERU WOULD DEFEND ITSELF. FOR EVERY CHILEAN UNIT MOVED NORTH, A PERUVIAN UNIT WOULD MOVE SOUTH. IF TENSIONS CONTINUED TO DEVELOP, A MATCH COULD BE LIT AT ANY POINT,

PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING THE AMOUNT OF CONTRABAND ON THE FRONTIER. IF PERU, FOR EXAMPLE, WERE NOW TO ARREST FOUR CHILEAN SMUGGLERS, THE CHILEANS MIGHT CLAIM THAT THE PERUVIANS HAD TORTURED INNOCENT CIVILIANS, AND AN INCIDENT COULD DEVELOP. ONCE WAR BROKE OUT, NEITHER THE OAS NOR ANYBODY ELSE COULD STOP IT, AND THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR EVERYONE.

8. ARMS CONTROL AND BILATERAL EFFORTS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, PRESIDENT VELSCO HAD SUGGESTED A GENERALIZED ARMS MORATORIUM. DE LA FLOR HIMSELF WAS NOW GOING TO PROPOSE SPECIFIC MECHANISMS, MAKING A SPECIAL EFFORT TO TALK TO THE CHILEANS. HE PLANNED TO PROPOSE TO CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER CARVAJAL THAT COMMISSIONS BE NAMED ON BOTH SIDES TO EXAMINE THE MATTER. THE PERUVIAN CHIEF OF STAFF WOULD VISIT HIS CHILEAN COUNTERPART TO CLEAR UP MISUNDERSTANDINGS. DE LA FLOR DENIED PERU HAD 300 SOVIET TANKS, AND SAID IN AN ASIDE THAT PERU HAD MADE AN ERROR IN BUILDING UP ITS JULY 28 MILITARY PARADE.

9. THE UNITED STATES ROLE. THE UNITED STATES WAS INEVITABLY INVOLVED IN BOTH PERU AND CHILE. BUT EVENHANDEDNESS WHICH LED TO SHORT DELIVERY TIMES TO CHILE AND LONG DELIVERY TIMES TO PERU WAS NOT EVENHANDEDNESS. ROGERS SAID THAT PEACE IS THE HIGHEST PRIORITY FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ASKED HOW THE UNITED STATES COULD CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE. DE LA FLOR ANSWERED THAT WE MUST INSIST ON EQUILIBRIUM AND SELL EQUALLY TO BOTH SIDES. CHILE HAS ALWAYS BEEN STRONGER.

10. PERU BESIEGED. DE LA FLOR ARGUED THAT REVOLUTIONARY GOVERN-
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MENTS HAD HISTORICALLY NEVER BEEN AGGRESSORS; INDEED, REVOLUTIONS HAVE ALWAYS COME UNDER EXTERNAL ATTACK. THE PERUVIAN REVOLUTION WAS A TARGET OF ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY THAT HOPED TO BRING DOWN THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. WHY ELSE DID THE FOREIGN PRESS ALWAYS EMPHASIZE PERUVIAN ARMS PURCHASES AND MAINTAIN SILENCE ON PURCHASES BY BRAZIL, ARGENTINA, AND CHILE?

11. THE SOVIET-CUBAN FACTOR. FROM THEIR STANDPOINT, SAID DE LA FLOR, THE CHILEANS WERE RIGHT IN WORRYING ABOUT SOVIET AND CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN PERU. DE LA FLOR SAID HE WOULD TRY TO EXPLAIN TO CARVAJAL THAT PERU'S EXPERIENCE WITH CUBA WAS VERY DIFFERENT FROM CHILE'S. DE LA FLOR SAID THAT A CONFLICT BETWEEN PERU AND CHILE WOULD BE A VICTORY FOR THE SOVIET UNION. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT NO CONFLICT TAKE PLACE AND THAT THE WASTE OF ARMS EXPENDITURES BE STOPPED.

12. OAS SECRETARY GENERAL. THE MEETING ENDED WITH DE LA FLOR INDICATING THAT PERU WAS INTERESTED IN PROPOSING GARCIA BEDOYA ON THE SECOND BALLOT. HE CHARACTERIZED GARCIA BEDOYA AS "PROGRESSIVE, BUT NOT TOO PROGRESSIVE", AND ASKED THAT WE TAKE A POSITION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT THEY COULD DECIDE WHETHER

TO PUT FORTH BEDOYA'S CANDIDACY. ROGERS ANSWERED THAT WE HAVE NO CANDIDATE, THAT WE RESPECT BEDOYA'S PERSONAL COMPETENCE; AND THAT WE WANTED TO AVOID GIVING ANY IMPRESSION OF FAVORITISM AT THIS TIME. ROGERS AND DE LA FLOR AGREED THAT GARCIA BEDOYA'S POTENTIAL CANDIDACY WAS ENCOURAGING BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE IT IMPLIED FOR THE OAS.

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